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Organ allograft transplantation, as a life-saving procedure for those in end-
stage irreversible organ failure, has benefited and progressed because of 
the innovations in clinical and pharmacological research. Advancing the 
early studies in transplantation Dr. Joseph Murray and colleagues were 
among the first to use pharmacological agents in transplant patients. I 
Initially, the agents used to enhance graft acceptance were either cytotoxic 
and suppressed all dividing cells in the body or cytostatic, such as the 
steroids, which attenuated the immune cells.2 These drugs, however, were 
non-specific, had unpredictable efficacy, and usually grave side effects. As 
knowledge and understanding of the immune system unfolded, so did new 
concepts for designing better methods of preventing organ allograft 
rejection. Early on, attention centered on the theory of graft "foreignness", 
but in the era of molecular biology, it has expanded to include the 
intricacies of the intracellular environment and the events, which comprise 
the recognition, activation and cellular proliferation of the immune 
response. This science has unmasked new strategies for the identification 
of targets for immunopharmacological intervention, so that each phase in 
the intracellular signaling system is available for modification or inhibition 
to alleviate the aggressive response that destroys the transplanted organ. 
Now more specific agents, which are directed to a distinct component 
of the immune response, are used to inhibit the initiation phase. In 1984, 
the discovery and use Cyclosporin-A (CsA), a powerful new 
immunosuppressive drug that Jowers significantly the chances of rejecting 
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the new organ, truly revolutionized the field of organ transplantation and is 
to this day the mainstay of clinical immunosuppression. CsA is selective 
for T cells and devoid of bone marrow cytotoxicity and is also a valued 
probe for medical and pharmacological research.3 It is not, however, 
without unwanted side effects, which often increase with duration of 
therapy. For an allograft to function indefinitely immunosuppressive 
therapy must be taken continuously. 
Most recently, research in immunology has expanded to investigate 
the totality of the immune response, including cellular communication and 
the signals that govern it. This approach provides the precision and 
discrimination to target the cells immediately involved in the immune 
response, and not the immune cells responsible for prevention of disease. 
The untold advantage to this method is the development of a stable 
tolerance where the immune system no longer detects the graft as foreign 
and the graft survives without further immunosuppression.4 The great 
scientific and clinical investigations and advances in organ transplantation 
have evoked some novel ethical questions and consequences. 
Unquestionably, as organ transplantation has become more successful and 
available, one of the major, if not the most significant, ethical questions to 
be resolved is the gap between the number of recipients in need of vital 
organs and the availabiJity of life-saving donor organs for transplantation. 
Organ procurement and allocation presents some of the major moral 
problems in medicine: the role of the physician and surgeon, patient 
autonomy, respect for the dying and the deceased, and the equitable 
distribution of scarce resources. First, since the majority (> 85%) of 
transplantable organs, primarily kidneys, are from cadaver donors, the 
definition of death has been a problematic issue. Ontologically, death is the 
loss of personhood, but medically quantitative criteria are required. In 
1968, the concept of brain death was formulated at Harvard Medical 
School in direct response to the transplant teams, and replaced the former 
criteria of cardiopulmonary cessation.5 In 1981, the Committee on Morals 
and Ethics of the Transplantation Society articulated the objective 
judgment of death as the irreversible cessation of all brain function, so that 
the decision was made independent of the transplant team and the need for 
organs.6 The concern was to ensure that organ donation was not connected 
with the definition of death; this is a potential and dangerous sortie into the 
discussion of the worth and existence of a life. 
Secondly, what comprises informed consent for organ donation? In 
the United States, informed consent requires explicit consent from the 
donor before death by written advance directives, called "opting-in", or by 
proxy consent from the next-of-kin. Individuals may also "opt-out" of 
donation through a written directive of refusal. In other countries societal 
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needs are placed above individual autonomy and altruism. The 1976 
Presumed Consent Law in France argues that the needs of society outweigh 
those of the individual to control bodily remains after death.? Austria has 
adopted a policy whereby the state assigns dominion over bodies to 
physicians for important social purposes such as research and organ 
transplantation. 
To increase organ donation in the United States, the 1986 Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act mandated that all federally funded hospitals make a 
required request to ensure that every potential donor be notified of the 
transplant option and asked to make a donation and that organ procurement 
agencies be notified of potential donors.8 Nonetheless, the moral means of 
organ donation is traditionally by voluntary consent based on altruism. 
Approximately fifteen per cent of kidney transplants are from living-
related donors, which raises some serious social and ethical questions 
regarding this procedure as often both the donor and recipient are minors. 
Elective nephrectomy to save the life of another human being is a serious 
issue to be weighed with great responsibility and deserving of deep moral 
reflection by the patients (if they are of age), the family, the physician, and 
the surgeon. Dr. Murray has written that the volunteer donor must, without 
coercion, freely consent to the act of donation as a gift, which in essence is 
the purest form of charity.9 Further, the donor must not be deprived of the 
opportunity to save a loved one. According to Clinical Bioethicist, Dr. 
Pellegrino, the doctor, using the virtue of prudence, seeks to preserve 
human life by means based on unyielding concern for the welfare of the 
individual patient. 10 
These and other attempts to increase organ donation have been 
implemented to combat the current climate of commercialization and the 
covert buying and selling of organs. The hazards of commodification of 
organs are imminent. Proposals for a marketing and business approach to 
organ collection have been put forward by health policy analyst, Jeffrey 
Prottas, who argues that organ donation and procurement is more than a 
moral enterprise. I I It should be regarded as a not-for-profit industry that 
engages and encourages altruism. Others, moving beyond the idea of 
donation as gift, have proposed the adoption of a system of financial 
incentives or regulated compensation to organ donors or their next of kin as 
a mechanism to increase the supply of organs. 12 Their intent is to foster 
greater efficiency and coordination in the allocation process; and even if it 
is morally marginal, it is preferable to the acceptance of suffering and death 
of those who cannot get transplants. 13 In shifting from a gift to a market 
model, the conviction that economic and social ethics should be guided by 
the maximization of rational, self-interested free choices is without doubt 
materialistic individualism. Will human organs become legitimated market 
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commodities rather than altruistic gifts of life? The outcome will depend 
on the moral standing of society more than the shortage of organs. The sale 
of organs was condemned by the World Health Organization in 1947, the 
World Medical Association in 1985, the International Transplant Society in 
1985, and was prohibited by the 1984 National Organ and Transplant Act. 14 
This recurrent concept is morally repugnant and devalues all altruism 
and solidarity within the community. We, as humans, are not possessors, 
but stewards of our bodies as gifts from God. The community as the elected 
steward of the gifts of donated organs has the responsibility to implement 
policies for the allocation of scarce and life-saving resources in an 
equitable and just manner and to preserve what David Lamb has termed the 
symbolism of transplantation as relationship. IS For within the context of 
organ transplantation are all the deeper questions concerning what it means 
to be a human being, to have obligations towards others and to belong to 
the human family. 
The allocation of organs requires political and ethical imperatives for 
the efficient management of medical resources through an equitable and 
fair system of distribution. Such policy decisions may be based on 
principles of social utility, which measures the patient's capacity to benefit 
society - judgments that are prone to subjectivity and prejudice; on 
principles of distributive justice, which seek to maximize the fairness of the 
claims of all to basic goods - policies that may disadvantage the poor and 
the marginalized on society; or on egalitarian principles which stress the 
equality of worth of all persons as human beings. 
Initially, the ownership of donated organs in most organ allocation 
policies was under the dispositional authority of the transplant surgeons. In 
1986, the Task Force for Organ Transplantation stipulated that donated 
organs belonged to the community with the transplant professionals serving 
as the trustees or stewards. 16 This rule mandated public accountability and 
participation in setting the criteria for organ allocation. Currently, organ 
allocation is managed by UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing), a 
federally funded and publicly accountable nationwide organ procurement 
and transplant network, which has placed organ allocation in the public 
domain. I? 
UNOS attempted to make the system equitable by setting criteria and 
creating a formula for organ allocation to judge which patient would 
benefit most medically from receiving an organ. Specific technical points 
such as tissue matching and immunosuppressive therapies, time on the 
waiting list, and medical urgency influence judgments concerning 
allocation to outside the community or between two patients within the 
community. Medical utility for maximum welfare of patients in end-stage 
organ failure considers factors that influence both graft and patient survival 
94 Linacre Quarterly 
and potential need. When an organ becomes available the most suitable 
recipient on the waiting list is identified by a computer match between the 
transplant center and UNOS. However, the "right" distribution policy is 
still a function of the best clinical judgment. Recently, two novel 
technologies have been investigated as alternative sources for organs and 
tissues: xenotransplantation and stem cell research. 
As a result of the organ donor shortage, which was declared a public 
health crisis in 1991, there has emerged new interest in the idea of cross-
species transplantation or xenotransplantation. Xenotransplantation is 
appealing because the organs are available, they are biological, in that there 
is adequate tissue to support organ physiology, and they are totally 
implantable in contrast to artificial devices. 18 Additionally, they can serve 
as life-saving biological bridges until a human organ becomes available 
and the surgical techniques to implant them are similar to that for human 
organs. 
With efficacious therapies to inhibit organ and tissue transplant 
rejection and unique methods to genetically alter donor animals for 
improved compatibility with the host, xenotransplantation is an area of 
intense research and debate. Despite the early promising studies, these very 
advantages underscore and contribute to the major biological and ethical 
hurdles of xenotransplantation. The National Institutes of Health and 
Nuffield Foundation for Bioethics in the United Kingdom have held 
conferences to define and weigh the major scientific and ethical issues of 
xenotransplantation.19 Foremost is the critical issue of cross-species 
infectivity and pathogenicity, which questions the balance between 
individual patient need and possible danger to society. The potential spread 
of endogenous animal pathogens to human xenotransplantation recipients 
and possibly to the public is augmented by recipient immunosuppression. 
Such long-term therapies weaken the host defenses to infection and 
potentially may favor the activation of animal pathogens. Since it is not yet 
feasible or possible to raise donor animals that are "clean" and to ensure 
against infectious agents carried within donor animal organs, the genetic 
manipulation of the donor animals may provide an opportunity for animal 
pathogens to adapt to the human host.20 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in an effort to put the 
public health first and allow science to catch up with these possible risks, 
issued a moratorium on xenotransplant clinical trials. Human trials would 
only take place if the risks were deemed low and acceptable. However, the 
moratorium was relaxed in favor of "cautious" continuation of the trials 
under strict supervision.21 
Is this decision tantamount to exposing the public to potentially 
serious risks that may have long-term consequences without their consent 
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or awareness? This question was posed by Dr. Fritz Bach, from Harvard, 
who has directed research in xenotransplantation. He has called for an 
additional Hippocratic ethic: to do no harm to the community. He believes 
that xenotransplantation requires a wide and informed public debate on 
whether this unquantifiable risk to the public is justified by the benefit to 
the few or if any trials should be allowed to proceed at present. 23 
Other ethical problems raised by the Nuffield Bioethics Commissions 
were: 
1. Is the imposition of harm (maleficence) on non-humans to benefit 
humans ethical? Is xenotransplantation an acceptable means for achieving 
this end (helping humans)? 
2. What of the cost borne by other patients if the allocation of 
resources is redirected away from areas of research and medical care to 
new and experimental therapies like xenotransplantation? Is the ensuing 
benefit to all an equitable and effective use of resources? 
3. Does xenotransplantation undermine human altruism and the 
"gift" metaphor? Both Hans Jonas and John Lynch, S.J., view this gift as 
one of fraternal love - to give ourselves to others in ways that transcend 
what is ordinarily expected of us. 23, 24 
The most recent technology of considerable debate is stem cell 
research. Scientists have isolated pluripotent stem cells from human 
embryos, which hold tremendous promise for treating human diseases.25 
Yet the retrieval of these stem cells results in the destruction of the viable 
embryo. The National Institutes of Health, in an effort to forward this 
research, argued for a lifting of the congressional ban on embryo research. 
In hearings in Washington, DC, June 28-29, 1999, the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC), in support of this research, acknowledged 
that the embryo is entitled to some respect, but claimed that any respect 
given the embryo must be tempered by the benefits or social good that its 
stem cells may have for "others" in alleviating suffering.26 This utilitarian 
calculus evokes the most basic ethical and moral questions, which have 
been addressed by Dr. PellegrinoY First, do human embryos have any 
inherent worth independent of any benefit to others and, secondly, does the 
embryo have a moral status that protects it? These are questions that must 
be considered separately from any potential therapeutic good or 
instrumental value of the stem cells. He calls for scientific "moral 
constraint" in stem cell research, in that morally unacceptable experiments 
should never be done. 
Morally and ethically, all human embryos are equally deserving of 
protection and respect as most vulnerable members of the human species. 
Though it is praiseworthy to apply the latest scientific advances to human 
suffering, this noble end cannot be achieved through less than noble means. 
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If the life of the human embryo is valued only for its benefit to others, then 
all human life is devalued. Scientists are obliged to pursue and support 
morally defensible means to accomplish the same end and seek alternate 
sources for procuring human stem cells (i .e., human cord blood and bone 
marrow) . 
In conclusion, what is the ethical responsibility that must govern the 
decisions and actions of patients, physicians and the community with 
regard to organ transplantation? Organ donation is based on accepted 
societal values. All transplantation policies must advance the moral values 
and concerns our society has regarding individual autonomy, importance 
of family, and dignity of the body. They must also embrace the social 
practices that enhance and strengthen altruism and our sense of 
community. Transplantation is not a cure - but a hope - and hope is a 
unique bond between the patient and the physician, the family, and the 
community.28 
As stewards of these organs both the transplant professional and the 
community have an important role in setting the criteria for organ 
procurement, allocation and distribution. The public trust in the prudential 
balance between principles of justice and values in these policies confirms 
the public 's willingness to donate organs. This trust implies a moral 
commitment and responsibility to acknowledge and consider the 
universality of human rights and the common good; the opportunity for 
each human person to achieve physical and spiritual goods which are owed 
to them because of their human dignity. As defined in the Consistent Ethic 
of Life and its founder principles, there is an equal dignity of every human 
person and the right to life of each human being; and the derived principle, 
that any violation of the rights of an innocent human being is unethicaF9 
The moral responsibility of all the members of the community, in 
solidarity, is to protect and preserve the sacredness and value of human life 
and to ensure that this undeniable moral factor is incorporated into public 
policies. If we eliminate from consideration our knowledge of ourselves as 
moral agents then we will never discover genuine moral knowledge or the 
practice of virtue. Either we bring value to experience or we find none. 3D 
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